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Abstract
Background: The evaluation of payment for performance (P4P) programmes has focused mainly on understanding
contributions to health service coverage, without unpacking causal mechanisms. The overall aim of the paper is to
test the causal pathways through which P4P schemes may (or may not) influence maternal care outcomes.
Methods: We used data from an evaluation of a P4P programme in Tanzania. Data were collected from a sample of
3000 women who delivered in the 12 months prior to interview and 200 health workers at 150 health facilities
from seven intervention and four comparison districts in Tanzania in January 2012 and in February 2013. We
applied causal mediation analysis using a linear structural equation model to identify direct and indirect effects of
P4P on institutional delivery rates and on the uptake of two doses of an antimalarial drug during pregnancy. We
first ran a series of linear difference-in-difference regression models to test the effect of P4P on potential mediators,
which we then included in a linear difference-in-difference model evaluating the impact of P4P on the outcome.
We tested the robustness of our results to unmeasured confounding using semi-parametric methods.
Results: P4P reduced the probability of women paying for delivery care (−4.5 percentage points) which mediates
the total effect of P4P on institutional deliveries (by 48%) and on deliveries in a public health facility (by 78%). P4P
reduced the stock-out rate for some essential drugs, specifically oxytocin (−36 percentage points), which mediated
the total effect of P4P on institutional deliveries (by 22%) and deliveries in a public health facility (by 30%). P4P
increased kindness at delivery (5 percentage points), which mediated the effect of P4P on institutional deliveries (by
48%) and on deliveries in a public health facility (by 49%). P4P increased the likelihood of supervision visits taking
place within the last 90 days (18 percentage points), which mediated 15% of the total P4P effect on the uptake of
two antimalarial doses during antenatal care (IPT2). Kindness during deliveries and the probability of paying out of
pocket for delivery care were the mediators most robust to unmeasured confounding.
Conclusions: The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries is mediated by financing and human resources factors,
while uptake of antimalarials in pregnancy is mediated by governance factors. Further research is required to
explore additional and more complex causal pathways.
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Background
Introduction
Much of the focus of programme evaluation has been on
outcome measurement and finding out whether or not a
programme works, with randomised trials being consid-
ered to be the gold standard for causal inference [1].
However, when dealing with complex interventions, it is
not enough to know whether they work, we also need to
understand how they work [2]. Process evaluation en-
ables us to get at the how and why questions and un-
pack the “black box” surrounding complex interventions
and is increasingly promoted within evaluation research
[3, 4].
One of the core functions of process evaluation is
to shed light on causal mechanisms or the process
through which a programme influences an outcome
[2, 5]. Examination of causal mechanisms is necessary
in order to understand why a programme worked, or
why it did not work, and whether the underlying the-
ory was sound. It enables theory building and en-
hances intervention design [6] and can support the
plausibility of outcome effects being associated with
the intervention in a non-randomised study [7], in-
creasing the internal validity of evaluation in social
sciences [1, 5].
Practically, causal mechanisms can be identified by
specifying intermediate outcomes or variables, referred
to as mediators, that are on the causal pathway between
the intervention and the outcome [6, 8]. The approach
used to investigate causal mechanisms involves the esti-
mation of causal mediation effects or the breakdown of
total causal effects into indirect effects (the effect of the
intervention on the outcome that passes through the
mediator) and the direct effect (the effect of the inter-
vention on the outcome through all other pathways) [9].
Causal mediation analysis has been employed to test
change pathways within the evaluation of public health
programmes, using individual-level psychological [9–12]
or physical characteristics [13], that may affect behaviour
change outcomes. A recent study also considered the ef-
fect of community along with individual level mediators
[14]. To the best of our knowledge, to date, there has
been only one study [15] considering mediators which
are relevant to the evaluation of interventions aimed at
strengthening health systems.
Payment for performance (P4P) is an example of a
programme which operates at the health system level with
the aim of improving the quality and use of health services
to enhance population health outcomes. P4P involves the
payment of financial rewards to health workers (and
sometimes to health facilities) based on their achievement
of pre-specified performance targets. P4P has been widely
used in the UK and the USA [16] and increasingly in low-
and middle-income countries [17].
There is a growing body of evidence evaluating the im-
pact of P4P [18]. Findings show that overall P4P has a
positive effect on targeted service outcomes [19],
although the evidence base in low-income settings is
limited to a small number of studies [17, 20–25]. There
has been less attention to the processes by which these
outcomes are achieved, particularly in low- and middle-
income settings [17, 26]. Three studies examined the
implementation process challenges facing a P4P programme
[27–29] and evaluations are increasingly looking at inter-
mediate outcomes that may have affected service delivery
[15, 30]. However, existing studies do not conclusively shed
light on the pathways through which P4P achieves out-
comes. Either they do not formally test the pathways or they
test them on a limited number of mediators [15].
The overall aim of the paper is to test the causal path-
ways through which payment for performance may (or
may not) influence the utilisation of maternal health ser-
vices. A previous study in Tanzania evaluated the impact
of P4P on service use, quality, equity, and health worker
motivation over a 13-month period from January 2012
to February 2013 using linear difference-in-difference
analysis [31]. The evaluation found a significant and
positive effect on two of the targeted indicators: an in-
crease of 8.2 percentage points (CI 3.6 to 12.8) in insti-
tutional deliveries, of 6.5 percentage points (CI 1.3 to
11.7) in the rate of deliveries in public facilities, and of
10.3 percentage points (CI 4.3 to 16.2) in the proportion
of women receiving two antimalarial doses during ante-
natal care [21]. In this paper, we extend this analysis to
examine the mediators of programme effect and to test
the causal pathway to improved outcomes.
Study setting
In 2011, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare of the
Republic of Tanzania introduced a P4P scheme in the
Pwani region, with initial payments being made in mid-
2012. The P4P scheme comprised four main components.
(1) P4P provided financial bonuses to health facilities
and district and regional health managers based on
achievement of maternal and child health (MCH) per-
formance targets related to service coverage and quality
of care. The targets were either for specific services (e.g.,
institutional delivery, postnatal care, family planning) or
for care provided during a service (e.g., two doses of
intermittent preventive treatment for malaria (IPT2)
during antenatal care and HIV treatment for HIV-
positive pregnant women). At the facility level, at least
three quarters of the bonus were distributed among
health workers. The health worker incentive represented
about 10% of the average health worker monthly salary
(about USD 30 per month). District and regional man-
agers received bonus payments based on the perform-
ance of facilities in their district and region.
Anselmi et al. Implementation Science  (2017) 12:10 Page 2 of 18
(2) The remaining 25% of the bonus went to the health
facility and could be invested in drugs, supplies, or facil-
ity improvements. This represents roughly 4% of their
average budget.
(3) Supervision was more frequent as facility perform-
ance data were verified every 6 months by national, re-
gional, and district stakeholders, whereby achievements
of targets, established by the Central Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare, were measured and bonuses paid.
(4) Primary care facilities had to open bank accounts
in order to receive bonus payments and could retain
cost sharing revenue in these accounts, whereas before
such funds were held at district level. Health Facility
Governing Committees, comprised of health workers
and community members are responsible for managing
facility resources, including P4P bonus payments, and
representatives were to be present to withdraw bonus
funds from the bank. However, the community members
on the committee were not eligible for bonus payments.
Conceptual framework
Our analysis was guided by a theory of change for how
P4P would affect the health system to improve outcomes
and a set of underlying assumptions about the change
processes involved (Fig. 1).
The increase in facility revenue from performance pay-
ments, together with financial autonomy resulting from
facility-level bank accounts, may generate the need for
increased accountability of resource allocation and use
at the facility level, potentially stimulating health facility
governing committees that are otherwise inactive and
improving relations between providers and communities
[32]. Greater resources and more accountability over
their use are expected to lead to improved availability of
equipment, drugs, and medical supplies at the facility,
especially in relation to targeted services. P4P is also ex-
pected to directly affect supervision linked to the
process of performance verification done by health care
managers, as this results in more frequent contact be-
tween providers and managers, who examine registers
and work conduct at the facility.
The direct financial incentives to health workers
that are tied to service delivery, coupled with the
changes in the availability of resources supervision
practices are expected to impact on health workers’
job satisfaction and increase motivation to adhere to
clinical guidelines [33, 34] and treat patients respect-
fully. Health worker knowledge may also increase,
through investment in training to improve skills
linked to incentivised services or through reallocation
of staff to under-resourced or poor-performing
Fig. 1 Theory of change of P4P pathways to impact via health system strengthening
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facilities. To stimulate service use and achieve targets,
health workers may undertake more outreach activ-
ities and/or reduce user fees and/or be more likely to
enforce exemptions for vulnerable groups [35, 36] or
encourage enrolment in community health insurance,
as this generates additional revenue for the facility.
We identified a set of indicators to measure each of
the steps on the causal pathway (Table 1). The indica-
tors were measured the household, facility, and health
worker surveys (Table 1). A full discussion of the ef-
fects of P4P on the availability of medical supplies
and drugs and on governance of facilities is presented
elsewhere [37].
Methods
Data sources
Surveys were undertaken in all seven districts in the
Pwani region where P4P is being implemented and
four neighbouring comparison districts with no P4P,
with 75 facilities being sampled in each of the study
arms, comprising 6 hospitals, 16 health centres, 11
non-public dispensaries, and 42 dispensaries. A health
facility survey was conducted at all facilities and 1–2
health workers per facility were interviewed. Inter-
views were conducted with women who had delivered
in the past 12 months sampled within the catchment
area of the facilities—a total of 3000 women per
round. Baseline data collection was conducted be-
tween January and March 2012 and endline data was
collected 13 months later [31]. All data could be
linked at the facility level [21].
Data analysis
We used causal mediation analysis to identify steps on
the causal pathway to the two significant outcomes in
the main evaluation (delivery in a health facility and up-
take of two doses of antimalarial drugs during preg-
nancy). We also considered potential mediators of a
third outcome, delivery in a public health facility, as we
thought that mediators may differ within public com-
pared to non-public facilities. We assessed mediation by
applying the linear structural equation model (LSEM)
Baron and Kenny [6, 38]. We estimated a single-
mediator model to identify the effect of P4P on media-
tors and the effect of the latter on institutional deliveries
and coverage of antimalarials during pregnancy. We
followed a four step process to assessing mediation.
Step1: Estimating the impact of P4P on outcomes
First, we replicated the analysis previously carried out by
Binyaruka et al. [21] to evaluate the effect of P4P on the
Table 1 Health financing, governance and human resources indicators tested as potential mediators linked to theory of change
Steps on the causal pathway/mediators Indicators for measurement (data source)
Strengthened supervision - Health workers received a supervision visit in the last 90 days (health worker survey)
Active governing committees - Health facility with a governing committee (health facility survey)
- Health facility governing committees meetings held in last 90 days (health facility survey and health
worker survey)
- Minutes of health facility government committee meetings available (health facility survey and health
worker survey)
- Health workers satisfied with relationships between health facility and local leaders (health worker
survey)
Availability of drugs, medical supplies and
equipment
- Index of stock out of 24 essential drugs in the past 90 days (health facility survey)
- Index of stock out of 5 drugs used during delivery in the past 90 days (health facility survey)
- Index of stock out of medical supplies in the past 90 days (health facility survey)
- Index of stock out of SP (IPTp) (health facility survey)
- Index of medical equipment functionality (health facility survey)
Health worker more motivated and
knowledgeable
- Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation score (health worker survey)
Improved patient provider interactions - Kindness during delivery ranked by women on a scale of 1–10 where 1 is minimum and 10 is
maximum (women survey)
Adherence to clinical protocol - Uptake of IPT 2 during ANC (women survey)
Increased outreach activities - Frequency of outreach visits performed by health facility staff in past 90 days (health facility survey
and health worker survey)
- Outreach visits conducted by health facility staff in the last 90 days (health facility survey and health
worker survey)
Increase insurance enrolment - Health insurance scheme available in the community (health facility survey)
- Number of community health insurance scheme members per health facility (health facility survey)
Reduction in user charges - Probability of payment at delivery at the health facility (or public health facility) (women survey)
Health workers kindness and knowledge have been re-ranked on a scale from 1 to 100 for ease of interpretation of the coefficients
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selected outcomes using a linear difference-in-difference
regression model:
Y ijt ¼ β10 þ β11 P4Pj  δt
 þ β12δt þ β13Xijt þ γ j þ εijt
1
ð1Þ
where i is the sample of women who gave birth in the
12 months prior to the interview in the catchment area
of facility j at time t. Yijt is a dummy taking value 1 if the
service was received by a woman and 0 otherwise. P4Pj
is an indicator of whether P4P was implemented in the
area where the woman was sampled from. We included
facility fixed effects (γj) to control for facility-level unob-
served time-invariant characteristics and a dummy vari-
able taking the value of 0 at baseline and 1 at endline (δt)
to account for year fixed effects. We also controlled for
individual-level characteristics (education, religion, marital
status, occupation, age, number of pregnancies) and
household characteristics (insurance status, number of
household members, household head education, and
wealth based on ownership of household assets and hous-
ing particulars) that are known to affect outcomes (Xijt).
The effect of P4P on outcomes was estimated by β1
1.
Standard errors were clustered at the health facility level.
Step 2: Identifying mediators
Second, we tested for the effect of P4P on each of the
potential mediators identified within the theory of
change (Table 1).
As in (1), we used a linear difference-in-difference re-
gression model:
Mijt ¼ β20 þ β21 P4Pj  δt
 þ β22δt þ β23Xijt þ γ j þ εijt
2
ð2Þ
where Mijt is the potential mediator and β1
2 indicates the
effect of P4P on the mediator. All mediators were mea-
sured at the health facility level. Items collected through
the health worker survey were either averaged across
health workers in the same facility, when they concerned
individual judgement (satisfaction and motivation), or
the highest value was retained when they concerned
health facility characteristics (time and content of last
supervision visit). Indicators of price, satisfaction with
the service received, and kindness during delivery that
were measured at the individual level were averaged
across women in the same facility catchment area. The
woman herself was excluded from the calculation to
avoid direct reverse causality and to test how the preva-
lent reported price and quality affected individual choice
[39]. Although some mediators were measured at the in-
dividual level and some at the health facility level, Eq. 2
was estimated at the individual level for all mediators,
for comparability with step 1 and step 3. Standard errors
were clustered at the health facility level.
Step 3: Identifying direct and indirect causal effects
Third, we evaluated the effect of P4P on the outcomes
of interest, by re-estimating Eq. 1, including the poten-
tial mediators Mijt identified in step 2:
Y ijt ¼ β30 þ β31 P4Pj  δt
 þ β32δt þ β33Xijt þ β34Mijt þ γ j þ εijt3
ð3Þ
We ran the analysis separately for each maternal
care outcome Yi and for each potential mediator Mijt
identified in step 2. If the estimated coefficient of
Mijt (β4
3) was significant and the effect of P4P was re-
duced compared to that estimated in (1) (β1
3 was
smaller than β1
1), we can infer that the effect of P4P
on Yijt is mediated through Mijt. For each set of out-
come and mediators, β1
3 measures the direct effect of
P4P on Yijt , while the mediated (or indirect) effect
was calculated as the product between β1
2 and β4
3, and
its significance verified by calculating their boot-
strapped standard errors [6]. These analyses were run
at the individual level. As for Eqs. 1 and 2, Eq. 3 was
estimated using a linear probability model and stand-
ard errors were clustered at the health facility level.
Step 4: Sensitivity analysis
The identified mediators can only be considered to be
“on the causal pathway” (enabling the measurement of
causal mediation effects) under a set of two assump-
tions, referred to as “sequential ignorability”: first, the
intervention assignment is independent of outcomes and
mediators and, second, the observed mediator is inde-
pendent of outcomes given the actual treatment status
and pre-treatment confounders (there are no unmeas-
ured confounders that affect both the mediator and the
outcome) [40].
The first part of the assumption is satisfied if the
treatment is assigned randomly or assumed to be ran-
dom given the pre-treatment covariates [8]. The use
of difference in difference regression methods allows
us to control for factors that may lead to the en-
dogenous assignment of the intervention subject to
the assumption of parallel trends. We verified that
the pre-intervention trends in a selection of mediators
and outcomes were parallel between intervention and
comparison areas [21].
The second assumption is still required to identify the
causal effect of the mediator on the outcome and cannot
be formally tested [8, 41]. To address this, Imai et al.
[42] propose a measure of the sensitivity to unmeasured
confounding. Since the level of correlation between εijt
2
and εijt
3 reflects the presence of unobservables affecting
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both the mediator and the outcome, the level at which
the mediation effect would be zero provides an indica-
tion of how plausible the assumption is. The smaller the
level of correlation, the less plausible the assumption.
Imai et al. [42] develop their approach using a potential
outcome framework and a semi-parametric approach for
the identification of direct and mediated effects of the
treatment. We set the prediction of potential outcomes
to be based on Eqs. 1, 2, and 3 used in the LSEM, so
that the sensitivity analysis would apply to the original
results obtained. The sensitivity analysis provides the co-
efficient of correlation (rho) between εijt
2 and εijt
3 at which
the average causal mediation effect (ACME) equals 0
[43].
The LSEM approach to mediation analysis requires
no interaction between the intervention and the aver-
age causal mediation effect, in or words that the aver-
age causal mediation effect is equivalent in
intervention and comparison areas. We test this as-
sumption by introducing an interaction term between
treatment and mediator in Eq. 3 and testing its
significance.
Since the outcomes are observed at the individual
level, but the P4P scheme is implemented at the health
facility level, we test the sensitivity of our results to the
level at which the analysis is carried out by re-estimating
Eqs. 1 to 3 on the outcomes measured at the health fa-
cility level, based on averages of individuals within the
facility catchment area.
We tested for clustering at the district level using a
bootstrapping procedure which is recommended when
the number of clusters is small [44, 45]. Since mul-
tiple hypothesis testing may lead to false rejection of
the null hypothesis, we also applied a modified Bon-
ferroni correction to adjust the significant threshold
accounting for the correlation between the tested out-
comes [30]. All statistical analyses were conducted
using STATA 14.
Results
Descriptive statistics
The intervention and comparison groups are similar at
baseline in relation to most of the outcomes and media-
tors considered (Table 2). However, in general, the com-
parison group performs slightly better than the
intervention group in relation to the mediators.
Mediation analysis
As it has been previously reported, there was a posi-
tive and significant effect of P4P on the rate of insti-
tutional deliveries (an 8.2 percentage point increase,
CI 3.6 to 12.8), on the rate of deliveries in public
health facilities (a 6.5 percentage point increase, CI
1.3; 11.7) and on the uptake of two doses of
antimalarial drugs during antenatal care (a 10.3 per-
centage point increase, CI 4.4; 16.1) [21] (Table 3).
The effect of P4P was tested on all potential media-
tors in Table 2, but results are reported only for
those significantly affected by P4P (Table 3).
P4P led to an increased availability of resources at
the facility, notably a reduction in the disruption of
services due to broken equipment (by −14.9 percent-
age points, CI −29.3 to −0.4); a reduction in the
stock-out rate of essential medical supplies (by −14.8
percentage points, CI −24.8 to −4.9) and drugs (by
−17.2 percentage points, CI −26.8 to −5.8), particu-
larly those used during delivery including Oxytocin
(by −36.2 percentage points, CI −55.9 to −16.4) and
Ergometrin (by −26.1 percentage points, CI −48.2 to
−4.0). P4P resulted in more frequent supervision.
There was an increase in the probability of having re-
ceived the last district or regional supervision in the
last 90 days (by 18 percentage points, CI 4.0 to 32.0).
P4P resulted in a significant increase in health worker
knowledge (by 18.8 percentage points, CI 10.4 to
27.2) and improved patient-provider interactions,
measured by patient perceptions of provider kindness
during deliveries (by 4.3 percentage points, CI −0.4 to
9.0). P4P led to a reduction in user costs (by 4.5 per-
centage points, CI -9.5 to 0.6), measured as the re-
duced probability of paying out-of-pocket for
institutional delivery by women living within the
catchment area of the facility (Table 3). No effect was
found on the remaining indicators on the causal path-
way, notably, health worker motivation, outreach ac-
tivities, and insurance enrolment.
Among all the potential mediators identified, only a
limited number of them significantly mediated the ef-
fect of P4P on the outcomes of interest (Table 4).
The coefficient associated with P4P reported in
Table 4 represents the direct programme effect when
controlling for a given mediator; where this is less
than that reported in the analysis without mediators,
there is evidence of mediation. The indirect effect of
P4P on the outcome, or the effect which passes
through a given mediator, is calculated by interacting
the coefficient associated with the mediator of interest
in Eq. 3 with the effect of P4P on the same mediator
in Eq. 2. The estimates of the direct and indirect
(through the selected mediators) effects of P4P on
outcomes are reported in Table 5 along with the re-
sults of sensitivity to the sequential ignorability as-
sumption (rho at which ACME equals 0).
The probability of paying for delivery and the per-
ceived kindness of health workers during delivery medi-
ate the effect of P4P on institutional deliveries, and the
stock out rate of Oxytocin mediates the effect of P4P on
deliveries in public facilities. When these are included as
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Table 2 Summary statistics of maternal care outcomes and potential mediators at the baseline and endline and by intervention and
comparison group
Baseline Endline
Intervention Control Total Difference
intervention
control
Intervention Control Total Difference
intervention
control
N Mean
(SE)
N Mean
(SE)
N Mean
(SE)
T test
(P value)
N Mean
(SE)
N Mean
(SE)
N Mean
(SE)
T Test
(P value)
Outcome
Facility-based delivery 1389 84.7
(36.0)
1485 86.8
(33.9)
2874 85.8
(34.9)
−2.1
(0.113)
1449 89.2
(31.0)
1462 83.1
(37.5)
2911 86.2
(34.5)
6.1
(0.000)
Public facility delivery 1389 76.7
(42.3)
1485 77.8
(41.6)
2874 77.3
(41.9)
−1.0 1449 81.6
(38.8)
1462 77.1
(42.0)
2911 79.3
(40.5)
4.5
(0.003)
Taken at least 2 doses of anti-
malaria drug during
pregnancy
1038 49.5
(50.0)
1212 56.7
(49.6)
2250 53.4
(49.9)
−7.2
(0.001)
1279 72.9
(44.4)
1252 69.2
(46.2)
2531 71.1
(45.3)
3.8
(0.036)
Potential mediators
Health workers received
supervision visit in the last
90 days (%)
1315 88.7
(31.6)
1489 90.8
(28.9)
2804 89.8
(30.2)
−2.1
(0.073)
1165 98.5
(12.3)
1172 84.7
(36.0)
2337 91.6
(27.8)
13.7
(0.000)
Health facility with a
governing committee (%)
1202 74.3
(23.0)
1384 70.5
(45.6)
2586 72.2
(44.8)
3.8
(0.029)
1119 80.6
(39.5)
1442 74.7
(43.5)
2891 77.7
(41.7)
5.9
(0.000)
Governing committee met in
the past 90 days (%)
1345 94.4
(23.0)
1444 93.0
(25.5)
2789 93.7
(24.3)
1.4
(0.124)
1395 63.4
(48.2)
1442 44.5
(49.7)
2837 53.8
(49.9)
19.0
(0.000)
Minutes of health facilities
governing committee
meetings available (%)
1249 92.7
(26.0)
1300 80.5
(39.7)
2549 86.5
(34.2)
12.3
(0.000)
1193 90.1
(29.9)
1077 92.9
(25.6)
2270 91.5
(28.0)
−2.8
(0.016)
Health worker satisfied with
relationship with local leaders
(%)
1374 63.2
(48.3)
1489 58.2
(49.3)
2863 60.6
(48.9)
4.9
(0.000)
1430 63.1
(48.3)
1462 57.1
(49.5)
2892 60.1
(49.0)
6.0
(0.001)
Drug stock-out index-general
(0–1 index) (%)
1323 54.6
(23.3)
1468 45.7
(27.8)
2791 49.9
(26.2)
8.9
(0.000)
1449 37.6
(25.3)
1462 45.7
(29.7)
2911 41.7
(27.8)
−8.0
(0.000)
Drugs at delivery-stock-out
index (0–1 index) (%)
1323 54.3
(31.1)
1448 38.6
(34.4)
2771 46.1
(33.8)
15.7
(0.000)
1449 36.7
(32.6)
1462 48.8
(37.9)
2911 42.8
(35.9)
−12.1
(0.000)
Oxytocin injection stock-out
last 90 days (%)
1302 42.0
(49.4)
1448 17.3
(37.9)
2750 29.0
(45.4)
24.7
(0.000)
1449 22.3
(41.6)
1462 33.7
(47.3)
2911 28.0
(44.9)
−11.4
(0.000)
Ergometrin injection stock-out
last 90 days (%)
1286 65.4
(47.6)
1408 51.3
(50.0)
2694 58.1
(49.4)
14
(0.000)
1449 42.9
(49.5)
1462 57.1
(49.5)
2911 50.1
(50.0)
−14.2
(0.000)
Misoprostol tablet stock-out
last 90 days (%)
1302 58.8
(49.2)
1428 49.1
(50.0)
2730 53.7
(49.9)
9.7
(0.000)
1449 44.8
(49.7)
1462 55.7
(49.7)
2911 50.3
(50.0)
−10.9
(0.000)
Medical supplies stock-out
index (0–1 index) (%)
1180 39.3
(25.3)
1227 25.6
(23.2)
2407 32.3
(25.2)
13.8
(0.000)
1449 20.0
(19.1)
1462 21.3
(18.4)
2911 20.6
(18.8)
−1.3
(0.060)
Index of stock out of IPTp last
90 days (%)
1302 27.3
(44.6)
1486 19.5
(39.5)
2770 23.1
(42.1)
7.9
(0.000)
1449 6.8
(25.1)
1462 10.9
(31.2)
2911 8.9
(28.4)
−4.2
(0.000)
Service delivery disrupted due
to broken equipment last
90 days (%)
1323 24.8
(43.2)
1468 12.5
(33.0)
2791 18.3
(38.7)
12.3
(0.000)
1392 5.2
(22.2)
1462 6.4
(24.4)
2854 5.8
(23.3)
−1.2
(0.174)
Intrinsic motivation score 1374 −7.7
(95.7)
1489 7.7
(74.1)
2863 0.3
(85.4)
−15.4
(0.000)
1429 −7.2
(93.2)
1462 8.05
(73.7)
2891 0.5
(84.3)
−15.3
(0.000)
Extrinsic motivation score 1374 −13.7
(68.2)
1489 1.1
(82.0)
2863 −6.0
(76.1)
−14.8
(0.000)
1430 −12.0
(68.5)
1462 0.5
(80.4)
2892 −5.7
(75.0)
−12.6
(0.000)
Health worker knowledge (%)
a
1299 47.0
(27.4)
1467 67.7
(23.2)
2766 57.9
(27.0)
−20.0
(0.000)
1388 57.7
(9.8)
1347 59.6
(8.7)
2735 58.6
(9.3)
−19
(0.000)
Kindness at delivery (%) a,b 1389 74.8
(10.9)
1485 79.0
(10.1)
2874 77.0
(10.7)
−4.2
(0.000)
1449 88.9
(9.1)
1452 83.7
(11.7)
2911 83.8
(10.5)
0.21
(0.590)
Outreach visits conducted by
health facility staff in the last
90 days (%)
1358 60.6
(48.9)
1424 58.5
(49.3)
2782 59.5
(49.1)
2.1
(0.258)
1449 73.5
(44.1)
1462 60.0
(49.0)
2911 66.7
(47.1)
13.4
(0.000)
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mediators, P4P has no significant direct effect on the
outcome (Table 4).
The reduction in the proportion of women who paid
for delivery mediates 48% of the effect of P4P on institu-
tional delivery and 78% of the effect of P4P on delivery
in a public health facility (Table 5). The reduction in the
stock-out rate of oxytocin mediates 22% of the total ef-
fect of P4P on institutional delivery and 30% of the total
programme effect on delivery in a public health facility
(Table 5, columns 1 and 2). The kindness of providers
during delivery mediates 48% of the total effect of P4P
on institutional deliveries and 49% on deliveries in
public facilities. The increase in the timeliness of
supervision mediates 15% of the effect of P4P on the
uptake of two doses of anti-malarial drugs during
antenatal care (Table 5, column 3), but did not medi-
ate the effect of P4P on institutional deliveries. Uptake
of two doses of anti-malarial drugs did not appear to
be a significant mediator of the effect of P4P on insti-
tutional deliveries (Table 4, columns 1 and 2), but it
was borderline significant for deliveries in a public
health facility.
Sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis (Table 5 and Table 9 in the
Appendix) indicates that little correlation between the
error terms of Eqs. 2 and 3 (correlation coefficients ran-
ging from 0.02 to 0.04) would be sufficient to reduce the
mediated effect to zero for most mediators. However, a
higher correlation coefficient would be required to re-
duce to zero the indirect effect of P4P through a reduc-
tion of payment at delivery and increased health worker
kindness, on institutional delivery (correlation coeffi-
cients 0.23 and 0.20, respectively) and on delivery in a
public health facility (correlation coefficients 0.25 and
0.16, respectively).
When carrying out the analysis at the health facil-
ity level (Table 6, Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix),
the stock out rate of Oxytocin and the perceived
kindness of health workers at delivery still mediated
the effect of P4P on institutional deliveries, while
the proportion of women who paid for delivery me-
diated the effect on deliveries in public facilities.
However, the other mediators identified were no lon-
ger significant and no mediators for the uptake of
two doses of anti-malarial drugs during antenatal
care were identified. New mediators were also identi-
fied. For example, health worker satisfaction with
local leaders became mediator of delivery in a public
health facility. None of the indirect effects were sig-
nificant, however, as a consequence of the reduced
statistical power due to the smaller number of
observations.
A number of other sensitivity analyses were carried
out. We tested for significance of the interaction be-
tween treatment and mediator in Eq. 3 and found no
significant effect indicating that the average mediation
effect is equivalent in treated and non-treated areas.
We identified the same set of potential mediators
when we tested for the effect of P4P correcting stand-
ard errors for clustering at the district level. When
we adjusted the level of significance to account for
multiple outcome testing, the reduction in the stock
out rate of Oxytocin was the only mediator that
remained significant.
Discussion
Causal mediation analysis has been put forward as an
approach to understand causal mechanisms within
process evaluation [2]. However, to date, there is very
little empirical evidence of its application within the
evaluation of complex health interventions. Building
Table 2 Summary statistics of maternal care outcomes and potential mediators at the baseline and endline and by intervention and
comparison group (Continued)
Frequency of outreach visits
performed by staff in last
90 days
1358 2.0
(2.8)
1424 2.0
(2.2)
2782 2.1
(2.5)
−0.0
(0.843)
1449 2.5
(3.27)
1462 2.03
(3.0)
2911 2.3
(3.1)
0.48
(0.000)
Health insurance scheme
available in the community
(%)
1358 79.8
(40.1)
1429 55.9
(49.7)
2787 67.5
(46.8)
24.0
(0.000)
1449 84.0
(36.7)
1462 62.4
(48.4)
2911 73.2
(44.3)
21.5
(0.000)
Number of community health
insurance scheme members
per HF
991 23.3
(40.9)
1144 14.8
(31.9)
2135 18.8
(36.6)
8.5
(0.000)
1369 36.9
(52.9)
1424 32.5
(56.2)
2793 34.7
(54.6)
4.3
(0.038)
Percentage of women who
paid for delivery in a HF (%)b
1389 19.9
(20.0)
1485 14.3
(23.8)
2874 17.0
(22.2)
5.5
(0.000)
1449 0.133
(0.205)
1.462 0.119
(0.222)
2911 0.126
(0.214)
0.014
(0.082)
a Kindness and knowledge originally ranked in from 1 to 10, but rescaled here from 1 to 100 for ease of interpretation of the coefficient
b Calculated for each woman as average of the responses of all women in the same health facility catchment area, excluding the woman herself
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on an existing impact evaluation, we set out to test
the causal pathways through which P4P affected ma-
ternal care outcomes using causal mediation analysis.
While our finding of P4P effects on core maternal
outcomes is partly consistent with previous evaluation
studies in Rwanda and Burundi [20, 22, 30, 46], ours
is the first to formally test the pathways through
which P4P affects outcomes.
As in a previous study [15], we found that P4P affects
the level of inputs available in health facilities. However,
we tested for a wider range of mediators consistently
with our theory of change and found that they mediate a
significant proportion of the effect of P4P on the use of
maternal care services.
Reductions in the probability of paying out of
pocket and increased provider kindness during deliv-
ery mediated the largest share of the P4P effect on
institutional deliveries overall and in public facilities,
and these mediation effects were more robust to
unmeasured confounding. Oxytocin is a drug admin-
istered to induce or support labour and to manage
the third stage of labour reducing the risk of post-
partum haemorrhage [47]. The reduction in the rate
of stock-out of Oxytocin mediated 22% of the effect
on institutional delivery (up to 30% in public health
facilities), but the correlation coefficient at which the
ACME is zero was very low (0.04) suggesting that
the results are highly sensitive to unmeasured con-
founding. The effect of P4P on the availability of
Oxytocin is, however, consistent with our theory of
change. The increased availability of Oxytocin may
be due to additional resources made available
through P4P to facilities and/or greater communica-
tion with district authorities resulting from more fre-
quent supervision. The increased availability of
Oxytocin may be appreciated by women as a marker
for quality of obstetric care, and management of
bleeding, thereby influencing demand [48], though
Table 3 Effect of P4P on institutional delivery and on potential mediators
Effect of P4P (% change) Observations
Maternal care outcomes
Facility-based delivery 8.2***
(3.6; 12.8)
5747
Public facility delivery 6.5**
(1.3; 11.7)
5747
Taken at least 2 doses
of anti-malaria drug
10.3***
(4.4; 16.1)
4759
Potential mediators
Health workers received supervision
visit in the last 90 days
18.0**
(4.0; 32.0)
5100
Drug stock-out
index-general (0–1 index)
−17.2***BS
(−28.6;−5.8)
5659
Drugs at delivery stock-out
index (0–1 index)
−27.0***BS
(−43.4;−10.6)
5639
Oxytocin injection
stock-out last 90 days
−36.2***BS
(−55.9;−16.4)
5618
Ergomentrin injection
stock-out last 90 days
−26.1**
(−48.2;−4.0)
5562
Medical supplies
stock-out index (0–1 index)
−14.8***BS
(−24.8;−4.9)
5278
Service delivery disrupted due to
broken equipment last 90 days
−14.9**
(−29.3;−0.4)
5602
Health worker knowledge 18.8***BS
(10.4; 27.2)
5461
Kindness ranks for health workers at delivery 4.3*
(−0.4; 9.0)
5747
Percentage of women who paid
for delivery in a HF
−4.5*
(−9.5; 0.6)
5750
BS Significant at 5% level with Bonferroni adjusted p value for multiple outcomes: Bonferroni adjusted p value for potential mediators within three major groups:
Financing 0.0047, governance 0.0017, human resources 0.0414. Indicators within each category in Table 1 have been grouped into: governance (strengthened
supervision, active governing committees, increased outreach activities), financing (availability of drugs, medical supplies and equipment, increase insurance
enrolment, reduction in user charges), and human resources (health worker more motivated and knowledgeable, improved patient provider interactions,
adherence to clinical protocol). 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. Percent sign (%) indicates percentage points change
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Table 4 Effect of P4P and potential mediators on maternal care outcomes (results from Eq. 3)
Facility-based
delivery (% change)
Public facility
delivery (% change)
Taken at least 2 doses of anti-
malaria drug (% change)
Effect of P4P without mediators 8.2***
(3.6; 12.8)
6.5**
(1.3; 11.7)
10.3***
(4.4; 16.1)
Effect of P4P mediated by
Health worker received
supervision in the last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 5.6**
(4.0; 10.7)
4.3
(−1.5; 10.2)
10.7***
(4.1; 17.3)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 3.1
(-2.3; 8.5)
0.8
(-6.6; 8.2)
8.5***
(2.4; 14.6)
Drug stock-out index-general
(0-1 index)
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.8***
(3.0; 12.6)
5.5**
(0.2; 10.9
11.5***
(5.5; 17.4)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −3.6
(−9.2; 1.9)
−2.9
(−9.0; 3.2)
7.0
(−1.8; 15.8)
Drugs at delivery -stock-out
index (0–1 index)
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.4***
(2.5; 12.3)
4.6*
(−0.6; 9.9)
10.6***
(4.6; 16.5)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −3.2
(−7.6; 1.2)
−4.3*
(−9.0; 0.3)
0.8
(−5.6; 7.2)
Oxytocin injection stock-out
last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 6.3***
(1.5; 11.1)
3.8
(−1.6; 9.1)
10.7***
(4.6; 16.9)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −4.9***
(−8.4;−1.4)
−5.3***
(−8.9;−1.7)
0.9
(−4.2; 6.1)
Ergometrin injection stock-out
last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.1***
(2.8; 13.4)
5.7**
(0.1; 11.4)
10.8***
(4.7; 16.8)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 1.0
(−3.7; 5.6)
0.5
(−4.4; 5.5)
0.7
(−4.0; 5.4)
Medical supplies stock-out
index (0–1 index)
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.0***
(3.1; 12.9)
4.9*
(−0.8; 10.6)
10.9***
(4.3; 17.5)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −6.8
(−16.5; 2.8)
−8.0
(−18.2; 2.2)
1.3
(−9.8; 12.4)
Service delivery disrupted due to
broken equipment last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.7***
(3.0; 12.4)
5.4**
(0.1; 10.6)
9.9***
(3.8; 16.0)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −3.7
(−8.8; 1.5)
−3.7
(−10.3; 2.9)
−0.5
(−8.8; 7.7)
Health worker knowledge
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.6***
(4.0; 13.2)
6.6**
(1.5; 11.7;)
11.2***
(4.7; 17.6)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −5.6
(−14.5; 3.2)
−1.7
(−12.0; 8.7)
−3.4
(−17.1; 10.3)
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there is no literature highlighting women’s preference
for induction [49].
Although women are supposed to be exempt from
payment for deliveries in public facilities, often such
exemptions are incompletely enforced [50]. Also,
when drugs are out of stock, women have to pay for
them at private pharmacies. The mediation effect of
the probability of paying for care is consistent with
providers making a concerted effort to enforce ex-
emptions to attract women to facilities for their deliv-
ery [35]. The probability of payment is also likely
affected by the reduction in stock out of drugs
related to delivery that no longer have to be paid for
privately by patients.
Health worker kindness, measured as the mean rank
reported by other women in the same health facility
catchment area, was found to be a significant mediator,
suggesting that increased institutional deliveries could
be due to expectations of higher quality of the service
provided. This is consistent with our theory of change,
whereby health workers modify their interactions and
behaviour with patients to make services more attractive,
to increase demand so as to meet the performance tar-
gets. Literature from a range of settings has highlighted
the importance of provider attitude and kindness for
women’s demand for care at birth [51, 52]. Improved
timeliness of supervision, which we believe may be asso-
ciated with the verification activities carried out as part
of the P4P programme, significantly mediated 15% of
the effect of P4P on the uptake of two doses of antima-
larials during pregnancy. This indicates that increased
monitoring and coaching may lead health workers to im-
prove service delivery.
Referring back to our initial theory of change, the
mediators which explained the largest share of total
programme effect, and were most robust to unmeas-
ured confounding, rely primarily on health worker re-
sponse to the direct financial incentive. However, we
did not find evidence of P4P increasing motivation, which
was identified as a necessary precursor to behaviour
change within the theory of change. This could be due to
the limited sample size for the health worker survey, or in-
valid measurement of the underlying motivation con-
struct, which was proxied as job satisfaction. It is also
possible that health workers respond to incentives by
changing their behaviour without experiencing greater job
satisfaction. Our results also suggest that other compo-
nents of the P4P programme were relevant to outcome
achievements, notably the additional availability of re-
sources used to procure drugs and supplies, and more
timely supervision, though these effects were less robust
to unmeasured confounding. We found less evidence of
the effect of the increased facility financial autonomy. Ul-
timately, such information is useful as it helps identify the
programme’s most effective components and “levers” of
change.
In addition to identifying likely mediators on the path-
way to outcomes, our analysis also illustrates the applica-
tion of causal mediation analysis to the evaluation of a
health systems intervention, such as P4P, and specifically
the consideration of health systems mediators, rather than
individual level mediators, related to behaviour change.
However, doing so does raise practical challenges.
First, when mediators operate at the level of the pro-
vider or health facility and outcomes are measured at the
household or individual level, it is unclear at which level
Table 4 Effect of P4P and potential mediators on maternal care outcomes (results from Eq. 3) (Continued)
Health worker kindness
at delivery
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 4.3
(−2.2; 10.8)
3.3
(−3.2; 9.9)
10.0***
(4.0; 15.9)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 9.1***
(6.4; 11.8)
8.0***
(4.7; 10.3)
0.3
(−1.9; 26)
Percentage of women
who paid for delivery in a HF
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 4.0
(−2.5; 10.5)
1.5
(−5.0; 8.0)
9.4***
(3.5; 15.3)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −93.5***
(−122.7;−64.4)
−112.9***
(−141.0;−84.8)
−17.9*
(−35.8; 0.1)
Taken at least 2 doses of anti-malaria
drug during pregnancy
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 9.3***
(2.5)
8.2***
(2.9)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 1.4
(1.2)
2.1*
(1.2)
95% confidence intervals in parentheses; percent sign (%) indicates percentage points change; bold font indicates identified mediators
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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the analysis should be carried out. We carried out the ana-
lysis at the individual level, as we were interested in the
pathways to population outcomes, but we assessed the ro-
bustness of results to analysis at the facility level, and we
found this did affect some of the mediators. The difference
in results is in part due to the weighting based on the rela-
tive size of the health facility catchment population,
which varies from facility to facility, as well as the reduced
sample size and resulting lower statistical power.
Second, randomised trials of health systems interven-
tions are often difficult to implement, and quasi-
experimental methods may be the only way to assess
causal effects, as in this study. However, to date, causal
mediation analysis has only been used alongside rando-
mised controlled trials. We demonstrated its use within
difference-in-difference analysis. This approach rests on
the assumption of parallel trends between intervention
and comparison groups in relation to outcomes as well
as mediators. While we were able to assess pre-
intervention trends in outcomes, we could do it for only
some mediators [21, 37]. In the future, researchers
should seek to gather pre-intervention time series data
on outcomes as well as mediators. As in the main im-
pact evaluation [21], we used a linear regression model
to estimate P4P effects which allows us to use linear
structural equation modelling to generate our estimate
of mediation effect, although our outcomes and many of
our mediators are binary. We had, however, previously
demonstrated the robustness of our results to the use of
non-linear models [21].
The selection of mediators for inclusion in the analysis
was limited to those available within the surveys, so that
the effect through potentially relevant mediators, such as
the level of funding available at the facility, could not
not be tested. Our approach relies on the accurate meas-
urement of potential mediators and, where possible, we
used tools that had been tested and applied in previous
research to minimise the risk of bias. Future studies
Table 5 Indirect effect of potential mediators on maternal care outcomes
Facility based delivery
(% change)
Public facility delivery
(% change)
Taken at least 2 doses
of anti-malaria drug
(% change)
P4P
Total effect 8.2*** 6.5*** 10.3***
Standard error (3.6; 12.8) (1.3; 11.7) (4.4; 16.1)
Indirect effect of P4P on outcome through mediators
Health worker received supervision in last 90 days
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 1.5***
Confidence Interval (0.1, 3.0)
Percentage of total effect explained 15
Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.0343
Oxytocin injection stock-out
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 1.8*** 1.9***
Confidence Interval (0.7, 2.9) (0.8, 3.1)
Percentage of total effect explained 22 30
Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.0439 −0.0437
Average kindness (excluding woman herself)
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 3.9*** 3.2***
Confidence interval (3.0, 4.7) (2.4, 3.9)
Percentage of total effect explained 48 49
Correlation at which ACME = 0 0.2085 −0.0202
Mean of women who paid for delivery (excluding woman herself)
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 3.9*** 5.0***
Confidence interval (3.0, 4.8) (3.9, 6.3)
Percentage of total effect explained 48 78
Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.2326 −0.2590
Results obtained from LSEM model. Correlation at which ACME = 0 is derived using Imai et al. sensitivity analysis. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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should consider using qualitative methods to validate
and help explain mediators identified as being significant
through mediation analysis.
The application of causal mediation analysis to the
evaluation of P4P generates an estimate of average
causal pathways. The assumption is that all facilities
experience the same pathway to impact; however, it is
of course possible that facilities introduce different
strategies to achieve outcomes and that there is some
variation in pathways across facilities.
The assumption that interventions affect mediators,
which in turn affect outcomes, presupposes a temporal
ordering, of the change in mediators preceding that of
outcomes. In our study, we measured outcomes and me-
diators at two points in time: at baseline and endline.
Hence, changes in mediators were measured at the same
time as changes in outcomes. In the case of mediators
measured at the individual level, this was problematic, as
we would not expect a woman’s report of kindness dur-
ing her delivery to affect her delivery choice, rather we
would expect her choice to be based on perceptions of
kindness from the experience of other women. For this
reason, we estimated the mediator excluding the woman
herself. Further studies should seek to obtain measures
of the mediator prior to that of outcomes, either through
midline surveys or by framing questions appropriately
(for example, did you perceive that kindness during de-
livery had improved at your nearby facility prior to your
birth?).
While we were able to identify significant media-
tors and explain how much of the overall effect of
P4P each could explain, we were unable to deter-
mine the order of the causal chain. Some mediators
may cause other mediators; hence, there is likely to
be a hierarchy of outcomes (for example, increased
availability of Oxytocin may affect health worker
kindness, as increased drug availability improves
their ability to do their job, which in turn affects
service uptake). Epidemiology offers methods for
quantifying the effects of multiple mediators, and
their interactions, and decomposing them, but these
methods are still very recent and with limited appli-
cation [10, 11, 13, 41]. Most importantly, they rely
on identifying assumptions, which are often unlikely
to be satisfied or hard to prove within policy experi-
ments. Further analysis should explore ways to
examine more complex causal pathways, for ex-
ample, interactions between financing and human re-
sources or governance factors, and to assess total
mediated effect.
Conclusions
In this study, we found that the effect of P4P on institu-
tional deliveries was mediated by a reduction in the
probability of women paying for delivery care and an in-
crease in provider kindness during deliveries and greater
availability of drugs. The increase in coverage of IPT
during antenatal care was mediated by more frequent
supervision visits.
This study illustrates that there is great potential to
apply the method of causal mediation analysis to help
unpack the causal mechanisms of complex health sys-
tems interventions such as P4P, shedding light on how
they impact the health system to achieve population
health goals. We encourage further research of this kind
to strengthen the evidence base about how health system
interventions works.
Appendix
Table 6 Effect of P4P on institutional delivery and on potential
mediators
Effect of P4P
(% change)
Observations
Maternal care outcomes
Facility based delivery 7.87***
(2.4, 13.3)
300
Public facility delivery 7.4***
(0.9; 13.9)
300
Taken at least 2 doses
of anti-malaria drug
11.2***
(3.9, 18.5)
300
Potential mediators
Health worker received
supervision in last 90 days
19.2**
(0.2; 38.1)
266
Governing committee
met in the past 90 days
30.1***
(8.1; 52.1)
291
Drugs at delivery-stock-out
index (0–1 index)
−31.3***
(−51.8;−10.8)
294
Oxytocin injection stock-out
last 90 days
−38.2***
(−62.8;−13.5)
293
Ergometrine injection
stock-out last 90 days
−34.9**
(−62.7;−7.0)
290
Antimalarial drugs stock-out
last 90 days
−22.8**
(−42.6;−3.0)
294
Service delivery disrupted
due to broken equipment
in last 90 days
−18.6**
(−36.5;−0.7)
292
Health worker knowledge 18.9***
(8.4; 29.4)
300
Health worker kindness
at delivery
3.27
(−2.42; 9.0)
300
Percentage of women
who paid for delivery in a HF
−7.6**
(-13.6; -1.6)
300
95% confidence intervals in parentheses; percent sign (%) indicates
percentage points change
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Sensitivity analysis with data averaged at the health facility
level
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Table 7 Effect of P4P and potential mediators on maternal care outcomes (results from Eq. 3)
Facility-based delivery (% change) Public facility delivery
—public health facilities
only (% change)
Taken at least 2 doses of anti-
malaria drug (% change)
Effect of P4P without mediators 7.9*** 7.4** 11.2***
(2.4; 13.3) (0.9; 13.9) (3.9, 18.5)
Effect of P4P mediated by
Health worker received supervision in
last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 3.7 0.3 12.8***
(−3.1; 10.4) (−7.4; 8.1) (4.5; 21.2)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 0.3 -2.7 8.7*
(-6.9; 7.6) (-11.0; 5.6) (-0.2; 17.6)
Governing committee
met in the past 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.0*** 5.7* 11.8***
(2.2; 13.8) (−0.9; 12.3) (3.9; 19.8)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 1.8 −1.4 1.0
(−2.9; 6.5) (−6.7; 4.0) (−5.5; 7.4)
Drugs at delivery-stock-out
index (0–1 index)
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.1** 3.0 11.5***
(1.4; 12.9) (−3.5; 9.5) (3.6; 19.4)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −4.2* −5.5* −1.2
(−9.2; 0.7) (−11.0; 0.1) (−8.0; 5.5)
Oxytocin injection
stock-out last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 5.8** 1.9 12.3***
(0.2; 11.5) (−4.5; 8.3) (4.3; 20.3)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −6.3*** −6.9*** 0.4
(−10.3; 2.3) (−11.5;−2.3) (−5.2; 6.1)
Ergometrin injection
stock-out last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.3*** 4.5 11.9***
(2.3; 14.3) (−2.2; 11.2) (3.8; 20.0)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 0.6 0.2 −0.9
(-3.2; 4.5) (-4.2; 4.5) (-6.1; 4.3)
Antimalarials stock-out
last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.9*** 5.7* 13.0***
(2.9) (3.4) (3.9)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −2.4 −5.2* 2.5
(2.6) (3.0) (3.5)
Service delivery disrupted
due to broken equipment
last 90 days
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.7*** 3.9 11.4***
(2.0; 13.3) (−2.5; 10.3) (3.7; 19.2)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −5.0* −5.3 −1.5
(−10.6; 0.7) (−11.7; 1.1) (−9.2; 6.3)
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Table 7 Effect of P4P and potential mediators on maternal care outcomes (results from Eq. 3) (Continued)
Health worker knowledge
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.6** 4.3 10.1**
(1.3; 13.9) (−2.7; 11.3) (1.7; 18.5)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) −7.2 −3.2 0.5
(−17.9; 3.5) (−15.2; 8.8) (−13.8; 14.8)
Health worker kindness
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 7.8*** 5.2 11.6***
(2.2; 13.3) (−1.1; 11.4) (4.1; 19.0)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 0.3 −0.3 −0.11
(−1.4; 2.0) (−0.23; 0.16) (−0.34; 0.12)
Proportion of women
who paid for delivery in a HF
- Coefficient on P4P (B1) 8.2*** 3.0 9.9**
(2.5; 13.8) (−3.2; 9.1) (2.4; 17.5)
- Coefficient on mediator (B4) 3.8 −27.7*** −16.6
(−12.6; 20.2) (−2.4; 1.7) (−38.5; 5.2)
95% confidence intervals in parentheses; percent sign (%) indicates percentage points change; bold font indicates identified mediators
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
Table 8 Indirect effect of potential mediators on maternal care outcomes
Facility-based delivery (% change) Public facility delivery (% change)
Effect of P4P without mediators
Total effect 7.9*** 7.4**
(Confidence Interval) (2.4; 13.3) (0.9; 13.9)
Indirect effect of P4P on outcome through mediators
Oxytocin injection stock-out 3.9 5.0
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 0.024 0.030
Confidence interval (−0.00; 0.138) (−0.083; 0.143)
Percentage of total effect
Health worker kindness
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 0.1
Confidence interval (−0.019; 0.020)
Percentage of total effect
Percentage of women who paid for delivery in a HF
Indirect effect (coefficient interaction) 2.3
Confidence interval (0.4; 4.9)
Percentage of total effect 31.1
95% confidence intervals in parentheses; percent sign (%) indicates percentage points change; bold font indicates identified mediators *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05;
***p < 0.01
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Table 9 P4P Average causal mediation effect (ACME) and direct effects, sensitivity analysis using Imai et al. (2010) approach
Mediation analysis Sensitivity results
Mean [95% Conf. Interval]
Mediators for delivery in health facility
Oxytocin stock-out
ACME 0.017 0.006 0.028
Direct effect 0.059 0.021 0.095 Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.0439
Total effect 0.077 0.041 0.109
% of tot eff mediated 0.226 0.159 0.424
Health worker kindness
ACME 0.039 0.031 0.048
Direct effect 0.042 0.007 0.075 Correlation at which ACME = 0 0.2085
Total effect 0.081 0.045 0.116
% of tot eff mediated 0.482 0.337 0.864
Percentage of women
who paid for delivery in HF
ACME 0.041 0.032 0.051
Direct effect 0.040 0.004 0.072 Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.2326
Total effect 0.081 0.045 0.113
% of tot eff mediated 0.511 0.364 0.911
Mediators for delivery in public HF
Oxytocin stock-out
ACME 0.019 0.008 0.031
Direct effect 0.037 0.000 0.077 Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.0437
Total effect 0.057 0.021 0.096
% of tot eff mediated 0.342 0.202 0.933
Health worker kindness
ACME 0.033 0.026 0.042
Direct effect 0.031 −0.008 0.068 Correlation at which ACME = 0 0.161
Total effect 0.065 0.024 0.102
% of tot eff mediated 0.516 0.325 1.374
Percentage of women who
paid for delivery in HF
ACME 0.051 0.039 0.062
Direct effect 0.014 −0.025 0.050 Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.259
Total effect 0.064 0.025 0.100
% of tot eff mediated 0.791 0.506 2.051
Mediators for IPT2 uptake
Health workers received supervision visit
in last 90 days
ACME 0.016 0.002 0.030
Direct effect 0.102 0.038 0.161 Correlation at which ACME = 0 −0.0343
Total effect 0.117 0.056 0.174
% of tot eff mediated 0.133 0.089 0.280
ACME average causal mediation effect
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ACME: Average Causal Mediation Effect; DiD: Difference in difference;
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